The paper examines the effects of market organization on incentives to invest and on the volume of trade. Businesses purchase trillions of dollars worth of resources and manufactured inputs from other businesses both directly and through dealers. Hundreds of new dealers have entered the market with the advent of business-to-business electronic commerce. Buyers and sellers in business-to-business markets undertake substantial complementary investments that respectively raise the value of purchased inputs or lower the cost of manufacturing inputs that are sold. Such complementary investments are likely to be general rather than transaction specific. The paper examines three types of market organization: a search market, a dealer market and competition between a search market and a dealer market. In either the search market or the dealer market, there are incentives for inefficient under investment. The search market results in an excessive volume of trade and the monopoly dealer market leads to insufficient trade. Competition between the search market and the dealer market improves incentives to invest. Competition between dealers further enhances efficiency of investment and the volume of trade. The analysis suggests that the entry of dealers into the business-to-business market should stimulate investment by business.
microstructure of business-to-business markets. Knowing the effects of market microstructure on investment makes possible the design of more efficient markets. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of different market microstructures on buyer and seller incentives to invest. The results suggest that the entry of dealers should stimulate investment by businesses and enhance the efficiency of trade.
The paper examines three alternative market microstructures: a search market, a dealer market, and competition between a search market and a dealer market. These market organizations affect investment efficiency because they impact the marginal return to investment. I show that search markets lead to inefficient investment due to the uncertainty of the search process and since buyers and sellers share the marginal gains from investment after a match is made. This effect is similar to the traditional hold-up problem because a lack of contractual commitment in search markets affects incentives even if investment is not transaction specific. Next, I show that a monopoly dealer market can make matters worse. Even though the dealer commits to bid and ask prices, investment inefficiency occurs because a dealer with market power chooses a monopoly price spread that reduces the volume of trade.
When there is competition between a search market and a dealer market, I show that incentives to invest are enhanced for several reasons. The market power of the dealer is mitigated by the search market which reduces the dealer's price spread. Moreover, the presence of the search market gives some low-value buyers and high-cost sellers the possibility of trading within the price spread, so that the search market improves investment efficiency in a manner resembling contract contingencies. Finally, the presence of the dealer improves the efficiency of search by offering price commitments for high-value buyers and low-cost sellers thus enhancing investment efficiency. In addition, the price spread makes the lowest-value buyers and highest-cost sellers inactive, leading to self-selection in which only intermediate value buyers and intermediate-cost sellers enter the search market, thus improving the efficiency of the search market.
Markets with general investments provide ex ante incentives to invest, that is, anticipated terms of trade with potential trading partners affect returns to investment. Companies often do not know the identity of potential trading partners when making investments, which suggests that many types of capital investment by buyers and sellers are not transaction specific. The analysis shows that the establishment of centralized business-to-business dealers, in tandem with informal search markets, improves economic efficiency relative to decentralized search markets alone. Competition between multiple dealers narrows the price spread and crowds out the search market, leading to firstbest investment and to an efficient volume of trade. Therefore, increased competition between intermediaries should lead to improvements in the efficiency of business-to-business markets and consequently greater investment by companies that are customers and suppliers in those markets.
I begin by examining a decentralized search market with random matching. Buyers and sellers meet and bargain over the terms of trade. I show that random matching is inefficient because low-value buyers and high-cost sellers can complete trades successfully, possibly excluding highvalue buyers or low-cost sellers. This lowers the total gains from trade and results in a volume of trade that is greater than the efficient level. The inefficiency of random matching reduces the returns to investment, leading to under investment at the market equilibrium.
Next, I examine intermediated exchange by considering a market with a single intermediary who deals with many buyers and sellers. The intermediary posts a bid price for sellers and an ask price for buyers, who then choose whether or not to transact at the posted prices. Unlike random matching, the price spread excludes low-value buyers and high-cost sellers. Buyers and sellers invest before observing the intermediary's prices while the intermediary sets prices without observing investments. I assume that investments and prices are determined at a Nash equilibrium, that is, equilibrium investments and equilibrium prices represent strategic best responses. Because the intermediary follows a Nash strategy in setting prices, prices are not directly tied to investment levels, rather, they are a best response to equilibrium investment levels. Buyers and sellers are not subject to opportunism from contract renegotiation because the intermediary has no incentive to change prices in equilibrium. Since prices are not dependent on investment levels, pricing by the intermediary encourages investment relative to bilateral negotiation between buyers and sellers.
However, the stimulus to capital investment from equilibrium prices is offset by the intermediary's monopoly price spread, which reduces the marginal return to investment for buyers and sellers.
I then combine the direct exchange and intermediated exchange models to examine competition between the decentralized search market and the intermediary. I show that the combination of the two markets improves incentives to invest for buyers and sellers. Competition between direct and intermediated exchange reduces the intermediary's market power and narrows the bid-ask spread. Moreover, competition allows buyers and sellers to self-select, with high willingness-to-pay buyers and low-cost sellers trading with the intermediary, and buyers and sellers with valuations within the spread entering the search market. The self-selection of buyers and sellers reduces the economic impact of costly searching and matching. Very-high-cost sellers and very-lowvalue buyers are inactive in equilibrium. This means that they do not enter the matching market, which alleviates the inefficiency of random matching within that market. Moreover, because they are dealing with the intermediary, high-value buyers and low-cost sellers do not face any risk of exclusion from the market. The combination of the reduced market power of the intermediary and the self-selection of buyers and sellers choosing between the two markets increases the marginal return to investment relative to either the search market or the dealer market alone, thus increasing equilibrium investment.
The model of a dealer posting bid and ask prices follows standard models of financial intermediaries beginning with Garman (1976) , see Spulber (1996a Spulber ( , 1999 for a more comprehensive survey of market microstructure models. I extend Gehrig's (1993) basic model of competition between a dealer and a search market by considering a two-stage setting with investment by buyers and sellers in the first stage and Nash bargaining in the second-stage search market. Gehrig (1993) does not consider investment and assumes first-and-final offer bargaining under asymmetric information. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) allow intermediaries to compete with direct exchange in a random matching model with bilateral bargaining but also without investment. Spulber (1996b) examines competition between dealers when buyers and sellers search across dealers.
A number of related papers examine investment incentives in a competitive framework with general investments, although they do not consider the effect of intermediaries on the market equilibrium, see Acemoglu (1996 Acemoglu ( , 1997 , Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Felli and Roberts (2000) . The large search literature recognizes inefficiencies from random matching but does not consider investment or intermediation, see the discussion in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Pissarides (2000, pp. 183-203) . The analysis of intermediation presented hear sheds light on the causes of search inefficiency.
The article is organized as follows. Section II presents the basic model of investment and exchange and examines efficient investment with efficient matching. Section III examines the search market by setting out a second-best efficiency criterion for when matching is random and shows that under investment is inefficient relative to both the first-best and second-best criteria. Section IV examines investment when there is a single dealer. Section V considers competition between a dealer and the search market. Section VI addresses competition between dealers. Section VII considers some empirical implications and provides additional discussion of the results and related literature, and Section VIII concludes.
II. The Basic Framework
Consider a market with many heterogeneous buyers and sellers who make irreversible investments. Buyer investments enhance their expected willingness to pay and seller investments lower their expected production costs. Investments are general, that is, they do not depend on the identity or characteristics of prospective trading partners. The sequence of events is as follows.
Buyers and sellers invest before entering the market, so all buyers have the same investment level and all sellers have the same investment level. Then, buyers and sellers learn their own willingness to pay and costs respectively. Finally, buyers and sellers make trading decisions and complete transactions.
There is a continuum of buyers with uncertain willingness to pay v for a unit of a good 
The aggregate supply function is S (w, k) and S(w, k) 
There is a continuum of sellers with uncertain cost c of supplying a unit of the good determined by c = y + C(k). The parameter y represents the seller's type and is uniformly distributed with unit density on the unit interval. The seller's cost is decreasing in the investment k. The function C(k) is positive, strictly convex, and twice continuously differentiable. At price w, the aggregate amount supplied by sellers is S(w, k) = Pr{y: y + C(k) # w}. Buyers invest before observing their value parameter and sellers invest before observing their cost parameter. Before they observe their own types, all buyers are identical to each other and all sellers are identical to each other. Thus, we can restrict attention to symmetric investment equilibria.
Individual investment levels b and k equal total investment levels since the measure of buyers and of sellers equals one.
The buyer and the seller investment levels, b and k, and their value and cost parameters, x and y, remain private information prior to trade. After a match is made, the buyer and the seller learn
each other's private information. Investment levels impact expected gains from trade by affecting the likelihood of trade and the available net benefits to be allocated through negotiation.
First-best efficiency maximizes social welfare. First-best efficiency has two components:
Investments must be efficient and the market mechanism must be efficient as well. For the market mechanism to be efficient, the marginal buyer's willingness to pay must equal the marginal seller's cost, as in the basic supply and demand framework. For investment levels to be efficient, they must maximize total expected gains from trade. Moreover, the market mechanism must be efficient given investment efficiency and investment must maximize total gains from trade given efficient matching. 
Also, the total amount demanded should equal the total amount supplied, 1 ! x F = y F . Thus, using equation (1), the first-best volume of trade equals
Total expected gains from trade with efficient matching equals G 
Assume that there exist interior maximizers, although the maximizers need not be unique. Gehrig (1993) and Spulber (1999) for alternative versions of matching.
III. Investment Incentives in a Search Market
If a buyer of type x and a seller of type y are matched, trade occurs if and only if gains from trade are positive,
The second-best outcome is defined as the investment levels that maximize the expected gains from trade in a search market net of investment costs. With random matching, a high-value buyer of type Random matching in a search market satisfies the ex post efficiency criterion that buyer value exceeds seller cost, as in equation (4). Random matching is not ex ante efficient because trade should be restricted to higher-value buyers and lower-cost sellers, with marginal buyers and sellers as specified in equation (1). For any given investment levels b and k, the efficiency loss from random matching relative to efficient matching equals
The difference is positive because the right hand side is decreasing in δ for δ > 0 and zero at δ = 1.
Random matching would be efficient if and only if the market demand curve were everywhere above the market supply curve. The inefficiency of random matching results from the presence in the market of high-cost sellers and low-value buyers who are to the right of the crossing point of the supply and demand curves. For example, a buyer with a low willingness to pay,
, who would not buy under efficient matching, might be matched with a low-cost seller
, so that a high-value buyer could fail to find a match.
It may be surprising to observe that too many matches occur with random matching. With random matching, the expected volume of trade equals
]/2. Thus, the second-best volume of trade is greater than the first-best volume of trade evaluated at the same investment levels,
The possibility of successful matches for buyers or sellers who are to the right of the crossing point of supply and demand raises the expected number of matches. This shows that the inefficiency of random matching is due to the presence of low-value buyers and high-cost sellers, leading to excessive trade.
I now compare first-best and second-best outcomes. The analysis applies standard monotone comparative statics techniques, see Athey et. al (1996) . 
is strictly increasing in δ from equation (6), standard monotone comparative statics analysis implies that every maximizer of the first-best problem is smaller than every maximizer of the second best problem, δ
indicators for the first and second best problems serve as parameters. By monotone comparative
The proposition shows that because of the inefficiency of random matching, the second-best criterion requires greater investment than does the first-best criterion. The result that first-best investment is less than second-best investment is unexpected since the returns to investment would appear to be greater with efficient matching. The reason that second-best investment levels are higher is that greater investment increases the likelihood of trade. In a search market, buyers and sellers must invest more to overcome the inefficiency of random matching. Random search with bilateral trade satisfies only the ex post efficiency standard that buyer value exceeds seller cost. The resulting trading inefficiency leads to an investment efficiency criterion that is too strict. Efficient markets require less investment because there is no need for higher investment to overcome transaction inefficiencies.
Consider now equilibria of the search market. Before observing their type, and before entering the search market, the buyer and the seller choose investment levels to maximize their expected gains from trade. The sequence of events is as follows.
Period 1a:
At represent the Nash equilibrium investment levels with random matching in a search market.
After a successful match, the buyer and the seller engage in Nash bargaining and divide the gains from trade equally, so that the expected gains from trade for a buyer or for a seller equal
Assume that there exist interior maximizers.
Consideration of the Nash equilibrium shows that under investment occurs in a search market relative to the first-best and second-best levels. In the search market equilibrium with random matching, buyers and sellers invest before bargaining over the division of surplus. They correctly anticipate that they will not capture the full marginal return to their investment. Accordingly, they have an incentive to scale back their investment levels, thus reducing the value of a match relative to the second-best optimum.
Proposition 2. Nash equilibrium investment levels in a search market with random matching are less than first-best levels and second-best levels, (b
The Nash equilibrium trading volume in the search market with random matching is less than the second-best trading
Proof of Proposition 2. Nash equilibrium investment levels in a search market must maximize
is smaller than every maximizer of the first-best problem so that δ
. The trading volume is less than the second-best trading volume
]/2 is increasing in δ and δ
The Nash equilibrium trading volume in a search market may be greater than or less than the firstbest trading volume. Although the trading volume in the search market is greater than the trading volume with efficient matching for the same investment levels, the under investment at the Nash equilibrium with search may reduce the trading volume below the first best level.
IV. Investment Incentives in a Dealer Market
This section considers a market with a monopoly dealer and no search by buyers and sellers.
The dealer transacts with many buyers and sellers. The dealer posts an ask price p for buyers and a bid price w for sellers. Buyers and sellers choose their investment levels before observing prices and the dealer chooses prices without observing investment levels. The dealer , the buyers, and the sellers play a Nash noncooperative game in prices and investment levels. The sequence of events is as follows.
1a:
At 
The dealer's profit-maximizing output is a unique best response to the Nash equilibrium investment
From equation (8) and the inverse demand and supply functions, the Nash equilibrium ask and bid prices are
The dealer's equilibrium ask and bid prices straddle the Walrasian equilibrium price P W evaluated at the equilibrium investment levels, w
The buyer and the seller choose investment levels as best replies to the dealer's Nash equilibrium prices. The buyer and seller have expected benefits defined by
The buyer maximizes h
Intermediation reduces investment relative to direct exchange. Because the buyers and the sellers play a Nash noncooperative game with the dealer, the buyers' and the sellers' investment is a best response to the dealer's equilibrium prices. The dealer's prices are in turn a best response to the buyers' and sellers' equilibrium investments. Accordingly, the buyers, the sellers and the dealer have no incentive to revise their equilibrium choices. Because the buyers and the sellers take the dealer's equilibrium prices as given, they capture the full marginal returns to their investments unlike in the search market. However, the under-investment problem is exacerbated when the search market is replaced by a monopoly dealer.
There may be multiple Nash equilibria of the investment game. Since the buyers' and the sellers' benefit functions are increasing in each other's investment, equilibria with higher investments are Pareto preferred to equilibria with lower investments. To simplify matters, I restrict attention to the Pareto-preferred equilibrium of the investment game, see Milgrom and Roberts (1994) .
Proposition 3. Nash equilibrium investment levels in the dealer market are less than Nash equilibrium investment levels in the search market with random matching, and therefore less than the first-best levels and less than the second best levels, (b 
Proof of Proposition 3.
From the investment problems of the buyers and the sellers, equations (11) and (12) 
The same analysis applies for k. Also, after substituting for p D from equation (9) into the first derivative and differentiating with respect By Topkis (1978) , the maximum best-reply function for the investment game in the search market is above the maximum best-reply function for the investment game in the dealer market. By Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994) , the buyer and seller investment levels in the high-investment Nash equilibrium of the search market are greater than their investment levels in the high-investment Nash equilibrium of the dealer market, so that
Recall that the volume of trade for the first-best problem is Q 
The reason investment is lower in the dealer market than in the search market is that the dealer's price spread lowers the likelihood of trade, reducing the marginal return to investment, because only the highest-willingness-to-pay buyers and lowest-cost sellers will transact with the dealer. This monopoly effect dominates the benefits of the dealer market for buyers and sellers who receive the full returns to their investment when trade occurs. The intermediated equilibrium resembles efficient matching except that it also excludes buyers and sellers whose willingness to pay and cost levels fall within the dealer's price spread. A combination of direct exchange and intermediation would address this inefficiency by allowing direct exchange between buyers and sellers whose valuations are within the price spread.
V. Competition Between a Dealer and the Search Market
This section considers competition between a dealer and the search market. As before buyers and sellers invest before observing their types. After observing their types, buyers and sellers decide whether to enter the search market or to purchase from, respectively sell to, the dealer at the posted prices. Buyers and sellers entering the search market are matched randomly. The sequence of events is as follows. 
VA. The Market Equilibrium
The analysis of the market game is based on Gehrig (1993) See Gehrig (1993) and Spulber (1999) for further discussion. The equilibrium distributions can be shown to be uniform.
To see why the equilibrium is defined by these intervals, consider the buyers' decision problem since that of the sellers is similar. The buyer's expected value from entering the search market is
Suppose that the buyer of type X 1 prefers to enter the search market rather than to trade with the
Then, any buyer with a lower type x also prefers to enter the search
is strictly decreasing in x. the properties of the equilibrium hold even if the buyer (or seller) expects to be rationed in the search markets, although such rationing does not occur in equilibrium.
3
In equilibrium, both the dealer market and the search market balance. Thus, the critical values
of buyer value and seller cost are such that the marginal buyer's value and the marginal seller's cost are equal, 
The seller of type y sells to the dealer if and only if the net benefits from doing so equal or exceed those expected from direct exchange, Proposition 4. With competition between a dealer and the search market, the equilibrium bid!ask spread straddles the Walrasian price evaluated at the equilibrium investment levels, that is, (14) and (15), note that
Then, from equations (16) - (19), the inverse demand and supply functions are
The dealer's profit can then be written as follows,
Setting marginal profit equal to zero, the dealer's first order condition can be solved for the dealer's equilibrium output:
The search market is active and the volume of trade on the search market is positive and equals
The total volume of trade equals the sum of the dealer's volume and the search market volume,
The volume of trade with competition between a dealer and a search market exceeds the second-best and first-best volumes of trade when evaluated at the same investment levels, Q
VB. Incentives for Investment
Having characterized the market game in the second period, I now derive the first period 
analysis applies for k. So, by Topkis (1978) and Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994) The combination of intermediated and search has another advantage in that it enhances the efficiency of the matching process in the search market. The dealer's price spread diverts high-value buyers and low-cost sellers from the search market and guarantees that they will be able to complete a transaction without being displaced by matches with lower gains from trade. The combination of intermediated and direct exchange has an additional and more subtle effect on matching, The lowvalue buyers and high-cost sellers, whose values are outside the spread, are inactive since they would not find a suitable match in the search market. See the circled portions of the demand and supply curves in Figure 1 . Because these traders do not enter the search market, the inefficiency of that market is mitigated, even if it is not fully eliminated. The enhanced performance of the search market further increases the returns to investment.
Competition between a dealer and a search market reduces the dealer's market power and thus narrows the bid-ask spread. This raises the gains from trading with the dealer for buyers and sellers. The narrower spread also increases incentives to invest. Moreover, the narrower spread reduces the number of buyers and sellers entering the search market thus reducing market uncertainty and search inefficiencies.
Proposition 6. The Nash equilibrium with competition between the dealer and the search market results in a lower ask price and a higher bid price than the Nash equilibrium prices in a dealer market without a search market, w
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that Mg Topkis (1978) and Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994) 
Under investment persists with competition between intermediated and direct exchange.
When making investment choices, buyers and sellers take into account the possibility that they will wind up in the matching market and strategically underinvest. Moreover, the bid-ask price spread set by the dealer also reduces the marginal returns to investment.
For any given investment levels the volume of trade with competition between a dealer and a search market is greater than the second-best and the first-best efficient volume of trade, Q
. This occurs because of the excessive amount of trade in the search market. Even though the size of the search market is smaller due to the presence of a dealer, the total of trade with the dealer and trade in the search market is larger than the efficient levels. It is not possible to evaluate the efficiency of the equilibrium volume of trade with competition between a dealer and a search market. Since under investment is observed, and since the volume of trade is increasing in equilibrium investment levels, the equilibrium volume of trade may be greater or less than the efficient levels.
VI. Competition Between Dealers
Competition between dealers eliminates the price spread thus rendering the search market inactive. Competition results in the Walrasian equilibrium price so that matching of buyers and sellers is efficient. By Bertrand competition arguments, Gehrig (1993) shows that the Walrasian equilibrium is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for the competitive game with two dealers, although it is not necessarily unique. With competition between two or more dealers, the market price equals the Walrasian price evaluated at the equilibrium investment levels, p The proposition shows that markets provide incentives for efficient investment by buyers and sellers.
Suppose that dealers have constant marginal cost t per transaction, so that the equilibrium price spread with competing dealers equals p ! w = t. Then, a search market would still exist because of the price spread, assuming that direct exchange was costless. As the unit cost t approaches zero, the search market is displaced and the volume of trade and investment levels approach the efficient outcome.
VII. Discussion

VIIA. Empirical Implications
Market microstructure has significant implications for investment efficiency, as the preceding Thus, sales by dealers and other kinds of intermediaries constitute well over two-thirds of wholesale transactions. This is consistent with our assumption that the investments are general rather than transaction specific. The analysis presented in this article suggests that dealers improve allocative efficiency when they compete with search markets or when they compete between themselves. Moreover, the analysis suggests that competitive intermediation enhances dynamic efficiency by increasing the investment efficiency of suppliers and customers in interbusiness markets. These findings are consistent with the observed widespread use of intermediaries in interbusiness transactions.
The role of intermediaries as mechanisms for reducing search costs and enhancing investment efficiency suggests additional empirical implications. Since carrying out investment takes more time than the time involved in switching to new suppliers or distributors, it should be possible to observe the effects of such switching on investment. As a test of the hypothesis that dealers enhance market efficiency and stimulate investment by their customers and suppliers, firms that switch to using dealers (whether as customers or suppliers) should experience an increase in investment as compared to firms that are already served by dealers or firms who rely on search markets. The entry of additional dealers due to the growth of electronic commerce provides many additional instances of buyers and sellers switching from search markets to dealers.
Product standards provide another approach to testing the effects of market microstructure on investment. An increase in the number of industry product standards facilitates transactions with dealers. More product standards does not necessarily mean less product variety, but rather indicates industry agreements on the definition of product features. Accordingly, a greater degree of standardization should lead to greater trade with dealers. The analysis in this article therefore suggests that an increase in standardization in a particular industry should lead to increased long-run investment relative to other industries. There might be short-run increases in investment needed to adapt to the standard, but controlling for this might allow identification of the long-run effects of market efficiency gains on investment by suppliers and customers. The growth of business-tobusiness electronic commerce provides a stimulus to standardization, particularly due to the establishment of exchanges and industry buying and selling consortia. These efforts at coordination and standardization should allow identification of the effects of greater intermediation on investment since different industries will have different rates of adoption of electronic commerce.
VIIB. Markets with General Investments
The inefficiency of general investment observed here is due to ex ante incentives created by market inefficiencies. When there is a search market, inefficient matching and dividing the surplus leads to under investment. There is a growing literature on ex ante investment in a competitive framework. MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) allow contracting parties to switch trading partners after they have made investments, although the outside option is specified exogenously. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Holmstrom (1999) also consider general investments and examine conditions for efficiency. In Felli and Roberts (2000) , workers make complementary investments before being matched. In their model, workers make competitive wage bids so that matches are efficient, that is, the worker of the k-th highest quality is matched with the firm of the k-th highest quality. When both workers and firms invest, there are coordination failure inefficiencies in the form of multiple equilibria, some of which are inefficient. Acemoglu (1996) examines the interaction between ex ante investments and costly search in a labor market. Workers make human capital investments before finding out what firm will employ them and firms invest before hiring, with workers being identical ex post. Acemoglu (1996) interprets the under investment that results from random matching as "social increasing returns in human capital accumulation." Acemoglu (1997) also looks at labor market imperfections that lead to underinvestment in training. Based on my analysis, I would expect that the entry of labor market intermediaries would improve human capital accumulation. Internet-based job search sites, for example, alleviate some search inefficiencies and improve the job matching process, possibly enhancing the incentives of both workers and firms to make complementary investments.
The results presented here in a two-stage setting should extend to a dynamic analysis. The inefficiencies of search tend to persist in a multistage setting, so that market inefficiencies should continue to reduce incentives to invest. One would expect the beneficial effects of intermediaries on market efficiency to carry over to a dynamic setting, so that the presence of dealers should enhance investment over time. The results should also extend to a different information setting. The present model assumed that buyers and sellers invested before learning their types so that investment levels were the same across buyers and across sellers. If buyers and sellers invest after learning their types, investment levels will be heterogeneous. Thus, buyers and sellers will still have heterogeneous types after investing and the inefficiencies of the search market will continue to exist with heterogeneous investments. Accordingly, the presence of intermediaries would continue to enhance efficiency with heterogeneous investments.
VIIC. Incomplete Contracts
The hold-up problem is said to occur when buyers and sellers that share the surplus from exchange do not obtain the full returns to their investment. The economics literature on contracts has tended to focus on transaction-specific investment within bilateral relationships, see for example Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) , Grout (1984) , Hart and Moore (1988) , Rogerson (1992) , Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) , and Che and Hausch (1999) . In the contracts framework, investment incentives are ex post, that is, they depend on expectations about how the contract will allocate the gains from trade between the contracting parties. When contracts are incomplete or nonbinding, renegotiation leads to contract hold-up which creates incentives for under investment relative to the outcome that maximizes joint gains from trade for the buyer and seller.
Although the present analysis concerns general investment with many buyers and sellers, it yields some insights on bilateral contract models with specific investment.
The inefficiency of search has interesting implications for models based on bilateral exchange. By law of large numbers arguments, random matching of buyers and sellers in a search market is formally equivalent to a single buyer and a single seller who have independent random draws of types. Bilateral contract models, such as Hart and Moore (1988) , generally feature bilateral trade between a single buyer and a single seller who enter into a contract and then make investments before learning their own types. After learning their own types, the buyer and the seller then decide whether or not to renegotiate the contract and whether or not to trade. In that literature, the standard ex post efficiency criterion is used: trade occurs if and only if v $ c. However, as noted previously, with many diverse buyers and sellers, such an efficiency notion is second best. Efficiency would require that buyers and sellers be matched such that total gains from trade are maximized as in the standard supply and demand framework in which gains from trade are exhausted at the margin and high cost suppliers and low value buyers are excluded from the matching process.
Thus, the investment efficiency benchmark in the contracts literature corresponds to second best efficiency in the present framework. As shown by Proposition 1, the second-best efficient investment levels are greater than the first-best efficiency levels. Therefore, the investment efficiency criterion in the contracts literature that is used to show under investment due to hold-up requires investment above first-best levels. Note further that the investment levels obtained in the contracts literature in which buyers and sellers with transaction-specific investments cannot make binding contractual commitments corresponds formally to investment levels obtained here in the case where buyers and sellers are matched randomly in the search market. Accordingly, under investment in the bilateral contracts framework corresponds to under investment relative to the second-best criterion when buyers and sellers are matched in the search market.
The present analysis also has implications for the theory of the firm. The hold-up problem in the contracts literature is due to splitting the surplus in ex post bargaining, see Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) , Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , and Grossman and Hart (1986) . The contracts literature suggests that firms should vertically integrate when investment is transaction specific, to avoid contractual hold-up between primary input suppliers and companies buying those primary inputs. In the bilateral contracts setting, the boundaries of the firm would then be determined by contractual inefficiencies and the specificity of investment. In contrast, my analysis shows that by posting prices, intermediaries alleviate problems due to splitting the surplus. More generally, intermediaries reduce the problems associated with ex post bargaining by offering binding contractual commitments, see Spulber (1999) . If intermediaries have incentives to honor contracts because they deal with many buyers and sellers, they can make commitments that cannot be made by individual buyers and sellers. Thus, the solution to under investment is not necessarily vertical integration but rather the entry of intermediaries that enhance market efficiency and reduce or eliminate contract hold up.
VIII. Conclusion
The foregoing analysis shows that markets with competing dealers provide incentives for efficient investment and are therefore superior to decentralized direct exchange. The entry of competing intermediaries in business-to-business markets is likely to enhance complementary investments by firms in a wide range of industries. The benefits from increased investment and the improved efficiency of trade create market returns to the entry of intermediaries. Rather than engage in costly search and bilateral bargaining, buyers and sellers turn to intermediaries to handle exchange at posted prices.
With decentralized exchange in a search market, underinvestment has several sources. The inefficiency of search creates uncertainty about the likelihood of finding a suitable trading partner.
Moreover, random matching lowers the expected gains from trade in successful matches. Finally, bargaining with the trading partner means that buyers and sellers divide the gains from trade so that companies do not obtain the full marginal return to their irreversible investment, which is similar to the contract hold-up problem. By posting prices, intermediaries alleviate these three effects:
reducing uncertainty about finding a trading partner, reducing uncertainty about the gains from trade, and reducing the hold-up problem since buyers and sellers that trade with the dealer keep the returns to their investment. Market microstructure matters for the investment efficiency.
